author        = {J\"orn-Marc Schmidt and Michael Hutter and Thomas Plos},
  title         = {Optical Fault Attacks on AES: A Threat in Violet},
  booktitle     = {Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography -- FDTC 2009, 6th International Workshop, Lausanne, Switzerland, September 6},
  year          = {2009},
  month         = {September},
  editor        = {David Naccache and Elisabeth Oswald},
  pages         = {13--22},
  publisher     = {IEEE-CS Press},
  doi           = {10.1109/FDTC.2009.37},
  keywords      = {Fault Analysis, Ultraviolet Light, UV-C, Implementation Attacks, AES},
  abstract      = {Microprocessors are the heart of the devices we rely on every day. They often store sensitive data inside their non-volatile memory that should not leave the device. However, the memory, which also contains the program code, can be manipulated by ultraviolet (UV) irradiation. Previous publications focused on attacking security fuse-bits that prevent an adversary from reading the memory. This paper gives the first practical results demonstrating that not only the security fuse-bits but also the non-volatile memory itself is effected by UV light. Furthermore, we show that a malicious manipulation of the non-volatile memory causes the device to compromise its secrets. We emphasize this by presenting a practical attack on an AES implementation running on an 8-bit microcontroller. Our attack involves only a standard decapsulation procedure and the use of a UV lamp. It can be successfully performed at low cost.}