author        = {Michael Muehlberghuber and Frank K. Gurkaynak and Thomas Korak and Philipp Dunst and Michael Hutter},
  title         = {Red Team vs. Blue Team Hardware Trojan Analysis: Detection of a Hardware Trojan on an Actual ASIC},
  booktitle     = {Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy - HASP 2013, Second Workshop, Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 23},
  year          = {2013},
  editor        = {ACM},
  pages         = {1--8},
  publisher     = {ACM},
  doi           = {10.1145/2487726.2487727},
  address       = {New York, NY, USA},
  keywords      = {ASIC fabrication, PCA, SVM, hardware trojan, side-channel analysis},
  abstract      = {We infiltrate the ASIC development chain by inserting a small denial-of-service (DoS) hardware Trojan at the fabrication design phase into an existing VLSI circuit, thereby simulating an adversary at a semiconductor foundry. Both the genuine and the altered ASICs have been fabricated using a 180 nm CMOS process. The Trojan circuit adds an overhead of only 0.5% to the original design. In order to detect the hardware Trojan, we perform side-channel analyses and apply IC-fingerprinting techniques using templates, principal component analysis (PCA), and support vector machines (SVMs). As a result, we were able to successfully identify and classify all infected ASICs from non-infected ones. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first hardware Trojan manufactured as an ASIC and has successfully been analyzed using side channels.}